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Introduction 1
0F

Mobile broadband Internet access is highly
important to the American economy and
millions of users. There were almost 200
million mobile broadband connections by
the end of 2013 in the United States, far
more than the number of fixed broadband
connections (FCC, 2014a, Table 1). The
economic activity created by the provision
and usage of mobile broadband is sizeable,
and has been documented at the national
level (Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2011;
Thompson and Garbacz, 2011; Katz, 2012)
and specifically for rural areas (Whitacre,
Gallardo, and Strover, 2014). The benefits of
mobile broadband—and indeed the entire
broadband
ecosystem—depend
on
investment in deploying and upgrading
network infrastructure by broadband
providers. Thus investment in mobile
wireless infrastructure plays a vitally
important role in sustaining the growth of the
industry and the economy. Investment is also
the means by which robust facilities-based
competition among mobile broadband
providers develops, to the benefit of
consumers who enjoy more options, greater
wireless coverage, and lower prices.
The significance of wireless investment for
America implies that there is a high
opportunity cost to pay in terms of the
forgone benefits when investment is
The
author
can
be
james.prieger@pepperdine.edu.
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discouraged. Each dollar not spent on
investment destroys more than a dollar’s
worth of economic output and GDP, as well
as lowering earnings and employment, due to
the interconnected nature of the economy.
Given the high opportunity cost of forgone
investment, it is important to examine public
policy affecting the mobile broadband
industry to ensure it does not diminish the
incentives to invest. Infrastructure does not
grow by itself. Instead, the network
deployment underlying today’s broad
coverage for LTE mobile broadband is the
result of the more than $170 billion in
wireless capital expenditure (capex) the
providers have invested since 2010. 2
Preserving incentives and lowering barriers to
invest thus are paramount.
1F

Since broad network coverage is a valuable
aspect of mobility for many customers,
roaming—the process by which one wireless
provider uses another provider’s network—
has always played an important role in
mobile
communications.
Roaming
arrangements allow a provider to offer service
to its customers when they travel to areas
where the provider holds no spectrum
licenses, for example, or to serve customers
temporarily while it builds out its
infrastructure in areas it does hold licenses.
Data from Credit Suisse (2015), FCC (2015b), and
the major carriers’ 4Q 2015 earnings conference calls
indicate that wireless capex from mobile voice and
data service providers in the United States totaled
about $171.5 billion over 2010-2015.

2
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Current federal policy toward mobile data
roaming, however, has the potential to
discourage investment in infrastructure, and
indeed appears to have done so. In the last
decade, public policy regarding mobile
roaming has moved from allowing great
leeway in the terms and conditions reached
in private agreements between providers.
Instead, today’s rules grant ever more
bargaining power and lower rates to the party
requesting roaming from the carrier that
actually deployed the infrastructure. The
particular
policies
of
the
Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) toward
mobile data roaming are reviewed below.
The policies can be seen generally as
constituting a form of access regulation. With
access regulation, rules are promulgated to
mandate granting rivals access to a carrier’s
network infrastructure. Access regulation
enables (artificial) service-based competition,
as opposed to actual facilities-based
competition in which both parties invest in
building competing physical networks.
The problem with access regulation in
general and mobile data roaming in particular
is that mobile broadband providers with
weaker resources or more risk aversion are
tempted to delay deploying their own
infrastructure (Bauer, 2010). Firms with
resources available for investment have
incentive to delay, since part of their
expenditure will accrue to the benefit of their
rivals. That is, “host providers may have a
disincentive to invest in their networks if
other providers can ‘free-ride’ on their
investment via roaming”—a quotation taken
(in irony, given the FCC’s later decisions)

from the FCC’s own data roaming order. 3
The result may be that “industry may invest
less on a per capita basis and consumers may
consequently
experience
slower
improvements of the price/quality ratio over
time” (Bauer, 2010, p.76).
2F

The investigation here of the consequences
of policy in the United States toward mobile
data roaming begins in the next section with
discussion of the general importance of
investment in infrastructure for mobile
broadband. Part A of section II reviews the
importance of mobile broadband for rural
areas, and part B quantifies the opportunity
cost of a dollar not invested. Section III
contains an analysis of the disincentivizing
impact of access regulation. General
knowledge
about
access
regulation,
investment, and the diffusion of broadband is
reviewed in part A of section III. Part B
presents a review of FCC policy toward data
roaming and an assessment of the particular
negative consequences for the economy. The
analysis indicates that the poor incentives
created by liberal data roaming policy may
have cost the economy an estimated $20
billion in output, $11 billion in GDP, $6
billion in earnings for workers, and 134,000
jobs. Under some alternative assumptions,
these opportunity costs are even larger.

II. The impact of investment in
mobile telecom infrastructure
Investment in the mobile broadband industry
contributes to economic performance
through direct and indirect channels.
Broadband investment boosts growth directly
through the obvious impacts of the money
3
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spent on the infrastructure and the
employment required to deploy it. There are
several indirect effects of the investment on
the economy, however. Most immediately,
the direct spending on infrastructure and
employment creates ripple effects in the
economy. When mobile broadband
providers purchase additional equipment, the
suppliers of the inputs increase their own
demand for the inputs needed to produce
their goods. Similarly, the extra earnings in
the
pockets
of
workers
stimulate
consumption in the economy at large. Thus,
each dollar spent on infrastructure
investment creates more than a dollar’s worth
of economic activity.
Mobile technology also induces economic
growth indirectly through the positive
externalities
provided
by
mobile
telecommunications as a general purpose
technology. Mobile broadband Internet
access and usage is an increasingly essential
part of the national and global information
economy. Broadband is an example of
general-purpose technology (Prieger, 2013).
A general-purpose technology is pervasive,
has
high
potential
for
technical
improvements, is greatly useful to businesses,
and can be employed to increase the
productivity of R&D in downstream sectors
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). A
general-purpose
technology
such
as
broadband spreads throughout all aspects of
the economy and creates productivity gains in
many industries, within and without the
broadband ecosystem. A general-purpose
technology like mobile broadband is thus
important to the economic health of a region
and the national economy.

In this section, the links between broadband
investment and the economy are reviewed.
Section A contains a general discussion of the
importance of mobile broadband and
investment for rural development. Direct and
indirect impacts, including non-economic
effects, are presented and discussed. Section
B turns to measuring the opportunity costs of
not investing in mobile broadband.
Conventional methodology from the United
States Bureau of Economic Analysis is
adopted to quantify the economic impact of
mobile broadband investment.

A. Mobile broadband is important for
rural development
Since data roaming is most common in rural
areas, the focus of the following discussion
will be on rural areas. Broadband brings
benefits of many kinds to rural America.
This section discusses the economic and
other impacts of investment in mobile
broadband and usage of the service.
1. Economic impacts of investment in
broadband
The exploration here of broadband’s impact
on the economy begins with its direct impact
on GDP. Next, evidence on the overall
impacts on GDP and growth is presented. An
examination of the relationship between
broadband and employment concludes this
section. Given the relatively recent explosion
of mobile broadband usage, many of the
studies discussed here do not separate
mobile broadband from fixed Internet
access. However, given the predominance of
mobility in the broadband marketplace in
recent years, the results of these studies are
applicable to mobile broadband as well.
Many studies document a positive association
3

between broadband availability and usage
and economic growth (Holt and Jamison,
2009). Although nearly all studies on the
subject conclude that broadband is important
for economic growth, different studies come
to widely varying estimates of the impact due
to differences in methodology and the scope
of impacts considered.
Private investment in broadband appears
directly in GDP. 4 Given the huge amount
that broadband providers have invested in
the United States, the direct contribution of
infrastructure investment is sizeable. Since
1999, broadband providers in the United
States have invested over 1.2 trillion dollars
in private capital expenditure on fixed and
mobile broadband. 5 Since 2009, investment
in network infrastructure in the nation has
averaged about a half of a percent of GDP.
In 2014, American broadband providers
invested $78 billion in total infrastructure and
$32 billion on wireless broadband capex. 6
These investments have been required to
expand steadily the availability and speed of
fixed and mobile broadband service offered
to consumers.
3F
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The main components of GDP as calculated for the
official estimates are consumption, investment,
government spending, and net exports. GDP is a gross
measure, and therefore investment is counted (or
more properly, gross private domestic investment)
includes both investment in new fixed assets as well as
investment to replace depreciated assets (BEA, 2015).
Due to leakages from imports, a dollar of private
investment may add less than a dollar to GDP.
The data on capex are from USTelecom
(www.ustelecom.org/broadband-industrystats/investment/historical-broadband-provider-capex),
who in turn used a variety of industry sources.
The total figure is from USTelecom (see previous
footnote); the wireless capex is from Credit Suisse
(2015).
4
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6

Broadband Internet access also appears in
GDP as a consumer and business service. A
conservative assessment of the direct impact
of broadband Internet access on GDP begins
with accepted methodology from the same
agency that computes the official estimates of
GDP for the United States. Greenstein and
McDevitt (2011, 2012) perform two such
studies to show that the direct impact of
broadband Internet access as a consumer
service was approximately $8.3 to $10.6
billion of new GDP in 2006 ($9.8 to $12.5
billion in 2015 dollars). For 2010, they find
that there was an additional $9.1 billion in
new consumer surplus created by broadband
(net of what would have accrued with earlier
technology) that does not show up in GDP.
Similar calculations show that by 2010,
broadband is conservatively estimated to have
created $9.1 billion ($9.9 billion in 2015
dollars) in new consumer surplus in the US,
leading to a total “broadband bonus” for the
economy of $39.8 billion ($43.2 billion in
2015 dollars). 7 After accounting for quality
improvements in broadband, mainly in the
speed of service, the estimate of consumer
surplus rises to $95 billion and the overall
broadband bonus to $126 billion ($103 and
$136 billion in 2015 dollars, respectively).
Other estimates that consider indirect
impacts or that do not carefully net out the
benefits from replaced technology often
arrive at figures that are much higher.
6F

Apart from the national accounting
approach, econometric estimates allow a
more inclusive assessment of how mobile
broadband increases national growth. Such
The broadband bonus is calculated as broadband
revenue less cannibalized dial-up revenue plus new
consumer surplus.
7
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studies can account for all the ways
broadband affects the economy, albeit
without necessarily identifying the paths
between investment and final economic
outcomes. In one of the studies looking at
mobile broadband in particular, Gruber and
Koutroumpis (2011) find a sizable positive
impact of mobile infrastructure on GDP
across many years and countries. The
authors
calculate
that
mobile
telecommunications
contributed
0.4
percentage points to GDP growth in highincome countries like the United States.
Thompson and Garbacz (2011) also found
econometric evidence that mobile broadband
has an important effect on GDP—in fact,
much more important than that of fixed
broadband. Gruber and Koutroumpis (2011)
also
find
that
mobile
broadband
infrastructure increases output per workerhour, contributing 0.3 percentage points to
annual productivity growth in countries with
the highest mobile usage penetration (such as
the United States). Another notable finding
from their study is that there are increasing
returns in the impact of mobile infrastructure
deployment. Thus, investment in mobile
broadband infrastructure in rural areas may
yield more than proportional increases in
income and employment growth.
Broadband can be similarly important for
creating and sustaining employment. As with
GDP, direct and indirect impacts can be
distinguished (Katz, 2012). The construction
of broadband networks creates jobs directly
through demand for labor to deploy the
infrastructure and the labor used to
manufacture and transport the equipment.
Additionally, investment creates further
indirect employment in the sectors further

upstream than the direct suppliers of the
inputs. Least proximately, but still directly
related to broadband investment, the extra
wages generated create additional consumer
spending, which can induce further usage of
labor throughout the economy. Several
studies in recent years calculate employment
multipliers, defined in this context as the
ratio of total jobs created (direct, indirect, and
induced) to direct jobs created from
broadband investment. Atkinson, Castro, and
Ezell (2009) find an employment multiplier
of 3.6 when jobs from all three sources
mentioned above are included. This implies
that for each job created directly the
additional demand for labor to build the
network, there are 2.6 other jobs created by
the additional demand in upstream industries
and induced by additional consumer
spending. Katz and Suter (2009) found a
slightly smaller estimate of the comparably
defined multiplier, 3.4.
For the overall impact of broadband on
employment, including the three channels
from investment described above but also
impacts from businesses, industries, and
workers made more productive by
broadband, we turn to econometric studies.
Reviews of the literature show that several
studies find positive links between broadband
availability and increased employment,
particularly during the recent recession years
when there was significant slack in the
economy (Katz and Suter, 2009; Holt and
Jamison, 2009; Katz, 2012). More recently,
Jayakar and Park (2013) find that US
counties with better broadband availability
had lower unemployment rates in 2011, even
after controlling for other factors. Investment
in mobile broadband infrastructure thus has
5

clear potential to improve the outlook for
employment in regional and the national
economies.
While the employment studies discussed
above were national in scope, a recent study
by Whitacre, Gallardo, and Strover (2014)
examined the impacts of broadband on rural
areas in particular. By carefully matching
counties with a high level of broadband
adoption to observably similar counties with
lower adoption, the authors are able to isolate
the effect of adoption on how employment
and other economic outcomes changed
between 2001 and 2010. The study is notable
both for its focus on rural counties and for
having a credible econometric approach to
identify the causal effect of broadband on
employment. They find that nonmetropolitan counties with high levels of
broadband adoption (defined as adoption
rates above 60%) had significantly greater
reductions in the unemployment rate when
compared with otherwise similar counties
with less adoption. They also find that nonmetropolitan counties with low levels of
broadband adoption (below 40%) had
significantly lower increases in employment
levels, compared with similar counties with
more adoption. The same study finds that
broadband adoption in rural areas leads to
higher increases in household income and
greater growth in the number of businesses.
Another notable result is that the availability
of higher broadband speeds in nonmetropolitan counties is associated with
greater reductions in the poverty level
compared to otherwise similar counties,
which the authors interpret as “suggesting that
broadband speed can potentially contribute
to general community well-being” (p.1020).

These finding are generally in accord with an
earlier study of rural areas using a similar
matching methodology. Stenberg et al. (2009)
paired each of 228 rural counties with a
similar county that had low broadband
availability. As in the study by Whitacre et al.
(2014), the set of similar counties served as a
control group. Over the years 2002-2006, the
group of early-adopting counties experienced
more job growth, particularly in the nonfarm
sector. Broadband-available counties also had
higher personal income and nonfarm
earnings growth in some of the years. Not all
of the apparent benefits of broadband
Stenberg et al. found are statistically
significant, but the counties with low
broadband availability in 2000 never
significantly
outperformed
the
high
availability group in any year of the study.
2. Other impacts of investment in
broadband
Apart from the economic impacts of
broadband investment and usage of
broadband service discussed in the previous
section, there are many other ways that
investment in the availability of mobile
broadband can improve the quality of life in
rural areas. A few examples of benefits of
broadband that are of particular interest for
rural communities are increased community
involvement,
greater
labor
market
opportunities
through
telework,
and
increased human capital through distance
learning and telemedicine (Stenberg et al.,
2009). 8 The Internet can foster community
interaction by lowering the cost of engaging in
civic affairs and participating in community
involvement. For example, it is much easier
7F

This section draws on the discussion in Prieger
(2013; 2015).
8
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for a rural resident to keep abreast of local
land-use planning and issues by accessing
information online than it would be to access
county records in person. Stenberg et al.
(2009), in their study of Internet usage in
rural areas, cite several empirical studies
finding that Internet use fosters civic
engagement. While the path from Internet
usage to outcomes of interest are not always
clear, the data show that using broadband is
positively correlated with higher levels of
community involvement (Stern, Adams, &
Boase, 2011). Stern and Adams (2010)
suggest
that
better
communication
technologies (such as mobile broadband)
lead to wider social circles and new ways to
find information about civic participation.
Such formation of “social capital” is most
important in rural communities, where
residents rely relatively more than in urban
areas on local relationships with others to
achieve personal and community goals. More
recently, mobile broadband has been found
to have a positive effect on digital citizenship,
the engagement in online political and
economic activities (Mossberger, Tolbert,
and Anderson, 2014).
Broadband can also have a vital role to play
in rural telework (Stenberg et al., 2009,
Morris and Goodridge, 2008). Many
American businesses engage in global
outsourcing for service support, yet
customers are often dissatisfied with services
outsourced to foreign countries. Couple
these facts with survey results showing that
almost two-fifths of rural residents are
interested in working from home and would
be open to telework. Finally, note that about
three-fourths of businesses which outsource
are interested in bringing some of those

positions back to the United States if rural
employees could fill the roles. For most such
positions to be feasible, quality broadband
connections would be required. Other,
specifically mobile telework requires local
rural employees in all cases. Examples here
include sales and support staff of firms
dealing with agribusiness. Of course, telework
creates other benefits besides employment,
including environmental benefits from
decreased vehicular travel and reduced
overhead and rents for employers
(Economist, 2008).
Telemedicine is another beneficial service
enabled by broadband in rural areas.
Telemedicine gives rural communities access
to some of the same health care
infrastructure that urban areas enjoy. In one
of the few empirical studies on the benefits of
telemedicine, a case study of five rural
communities in Oklahoma were found to
have saved $3.5M in healthcare cost for
teleradiology and telepsychiatry (Whitacre et
al., 2009). Some of the economic benefits of
telemedicine
include
reductions
in
transportation
cost
and
improved
productivity for rural residents, increased
work for local medical labs and pharmacies,
and cost savings to rural hospitals from
outsourcing procedures via telemedicine.
Mobile broadband networks can play
particularly important roles in telemedicine.
One comprehensive review of economic
analyses of heart failure monitoring systems
found that all the studies concluded that
telemonitoring was less expensive than usual
care in a hospital, with a range of 2-68% cost
savings, even before accounting for additional
factors such as travel costs and a lower
incidence of rehospitalization (Seto, 2008).
7

More and more e-health technology will rely
on high-speed wireless networks, turning ehealth into m-health. Some m-health
applications such as downloading diagnostic
data and lab results to smartphones are
feasible today, as long as mobile broadband
coverage is available in the area. Other mhealth applications are just coming over the
horizon of cost-effectiveness, such as
personal networks of implanted or wearable
body sensors. Since rural areas are more
likely to be underserved by local healthcare
facilities, leading to subpar healthcare
(AHRQ, 2015), medical technology that
allows remote monitoring or otherwise
removes the limitations of distance in
healthcare may greatly benefit rural
communities.

B. The economic cost of discouraging
investment
As discussed above, the total economic
effects resulting from investment in mobile
broadband are greater than the direct
expenditure necessary to deploy the network.
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) defines two types of spending
multipliers (BEA, 2013). Type I multipliers
account for the direct and indirect impacts of
an increase in final demand (the wireless
capex, in this case). The direct impact
includes all the inputs purchased by the finaldemand
industry:
communications
equipment, construction, etc. However, those
inputs themselves came from supporting
upstream industries, and creating the inputs
required additional purchases by those
industries. Thus the capex expenditure in the
ultimate industry results in further rounds of

new spending 9 as the inputs used by the
industries are linked to the outputs of the
supplying industries. The sum of the direct
and indirect impacts—the interindustry
effect—composes the Type I multiplier. Type
II multipliers add the induced impact of an
increase in final demand to the interindustry
effect. The induced impact arises from the
additional household spending of workers
whose earnings are affected by the investment
and who spend that additional income in
turn. The BEA calculates multipliers for
regions, industries, and commodities based
on regional input-output tables of the flow of
goods and services in the economy.
8F

The multipliers from BEA provide useful
estimates of ratios of total changes to initial
changes in spending on investment goods.
However, it is important to understand on
what the figures rely. The calculations assume
there are no changes in commodity or labor
prices resulting from the increase in
investment. The estimates thus stop short of
being a full macroeconomic multiplier, which
would incorporate Type I and Type II
impacts along with a host of other behavioral
responses of consumers and firms to the
investment spending. However, when there is
slack in the economy (as has been generally
true since the last recession), input-output
multipliers and complete macroeconomic
multipliers are more likely to be similar
(BEA, 2013). The BEA multipliers provide a
useful starting point to assess the initial and
not-too-distant indirect effects of investment.
Quantification of other indirect impacts, such
9

The spending diminishes as it moves upstream from
the originating industry because leakages occur
through saving or spending outside the US economy.

8

as changes in the prices of investment goods
due to increased demand or—even more
distantly—changed prospects for employment
due to the increased labor productivity,
outsourcing, or e- and m-commerce that
greater diffusion of broadband networks can
(eventually) entail, would be highly
speculative at best and is not pursued here.
The multipliers available to convert dollars of
investment spending to dollars of total
economic outcomes include those for output
(sales), value added (GDP), and earnings.
The output multiplier is the ratio of the total
change in sales to the change in local output
purchased by final users. Whereas the output
multiplier is for gross sales, the value-added
multiplier measures the total change in value
added per dollar of investment. Hence, the
value-added multiplier is comparable to
increases in GDP. Since sales inevitably
involve double-counting as commodities are
passed up and down the supply chain, the
GDP multiplier is smaller than the output
multiplier. The earnings multiplier measures
the increase in earnings per dollar of local
output purchased through investment. 10
Similarly, the total employment change
throughout the economy resulting from
investment in mobile broadband is greater
than the labor directly employed to design
and construct the network. Employment
multipliers estimate how investment spending
translates into additional employment. 11
9F
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Earnings include all additional wages, salaries,
proprietors’ income, and employer contributions for
health insurance. Proprietors’ income includes the net
earnings of sole-proprietors and partnerships.
The resulting number of jobs created may not all be
full-time positions, since the employment data the
BEA uses to analyze the employment requirements of
10
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Similar analyses using BEA multipliers to
estimate the economic impacts of broadband
investment in the United States have been
conducted by Katz and Suter (2009),
Atkinson et al. (2009), Eisenach, Singer, and
West (2009), Crandall and Singer (2010),
and Sosa and Van Audenrode (2011). These
previous studies typically used only the
employment multipliers and in some cases
also the output multipliers. 12
11 F

To make use of the multipliers, assumptions
must be made as to how a dollar of wireless
capex is spent. Previous studies made various
assumptions but generally assume spending is
split between wireless communications
equipment and construction. Capital
expenditure for purposes of investing in
wireless
infrastructure
also
includes
expenditure on other items. Since backhaul
is part of mobile broadband networks, and
since backhaul often involves wired
communications even when it is for wireless
last-mile
networks,
another
relevant
commodity is fiber optic cable. Extending the
capacity of wireless data coverage also
requires deploying additional equipment on
the backend, such as LTE equipment (i.e.,
the evolved packet core) and additional
capacity in the wired network (routers,
gateways, etc.) to handle the additional
communications traffic. Finally, engineering
services are required to design and
implement the new network infrastructure
the affected industries do not enumerate jobs in fulltime equivalents (BEA, 2013).
In some cases in the literature the output multiplier
has been mischaracterized as a GDP multiplier.
However, the value-added multiplier must be used to
determine impacts on GDP (Bess and Ambargis,
2011, p.14). Gross output counts goods and services
multiple times if they are used in the production of
other goods and services.
12
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and architecture. Depending on the
breakdown of how an investment dollar is
allocated to these items, the final multipliers
can be calculated as weighted averages of the
individual multipliers for the industries
producing these commodities. 13
1 2F

For purposes of the present analysis, three
sets of assumptions on the breakdown of
wireless capex are made. In the most detailed
scenario, it is assumed that capex is spent on
the complete range of items from radio
equipment on the towers to the additional
equipment needed to upgrade the backend
and wired network to handle the increased
traffic, as well as on construction and
engineering services for network design. The
exact percentages of—and the rationale for—
the capex breakdown are in the appendix.
For comparison, two starkly different sets of
assumptions are also employed for
comparison.
The
first
adopts
the
assumptions of Sosa and Van Audenrode
(2011) that capex goes to wireless
communications equipment in proportion to
industry figures for capex and the rest to
construction. 14 Their method applied to the
latest data results in the assumptions that 31%
of wireless capex is spent on wireless
equipment and 69% on construction. 15 The
other approach adopts the assumptions of
Crandall and Singer (2010) and Eisenach et
al. (2009) that 7% of spending is on
13F

14F

construction and the rest is on wireless
communications equipment. 16
15F

The resulting multipliers for capex were
computed from the BEA Regional InputOutput Modeling System (RIMS II), where
the region of analysis was the mainland
United States and the latest version of the
data available are used (the 2007 benchmark
input-output table for the nation and 2013
regional data). Since the input-output tables
pertain to purchases of domestic goods, the
multipliers must be adjusted downward to
account for imports of some of the
manufactured wireless communications and
other equipment. 17
16 F

The results for the main assumptions, shown
in Table 1, indicate that every dollar spent on
wireless capex creates $1.2 of output across
the domestic economy when accounting only
for direct and indirect effects (the Type I
effects). After including the induced effects of
additional household spending, the increase
in output rises to $2.1 (the Type II
multiplier). The increment to GDP (from the
value-added multiplier) is $0.7 for the Type I
multiplier, 18 but rises to $1.1 per dollar of
17 F

Discussion with an industry economist suggested that
assuming such a small portion of capex going to
construction is unrealistic. Nevertheless, the figures
derived from this assumption are presented for
continuity with and comparison to those previous
studies.
Details of the adjustment are in the appendix. Since
the previous studies appear not to have adjusted their
figures for import leakages, the multipliers in Table 1
appear to be more modest than those in some of the
previous studies.
Type I value-added multipliers are always less than
one by the nature of the input-output tables
constructed by the BEA. Only a dollar was ultimately
spent and the value-added methodology does not
double count any expenditure as outputs from one
industry are used as inputs in another. Total value
16

17

The particular commodities/industries are detailed
in the appendix.
That is, they calculate wireless communications
capex in the United States as a fraction of total capex,
and assume that an additional capex dollar will spend
on wireless equipment in the same proportion.
Sosa and Van Audenrode (2011) arrived at the
figures of 44% for equipment and 56% for
construction with their earlier years of capex data.
13

14

15

18
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Table 1: Final Demand Multipliers for Mobile Broadband Investment

Multiplier
Output
Value added
Earnings
Employment

Main
Assumptions

Alternate
Assumptions 1

Alternate
Assumptions 2

Unit
note

Type I

Type II

Type I

Type II

Type I

Type II

(1)
(1)
(1)
(2)

1.2
0.7
0.4
7.5

2.1
1.1
0.7
14.0

1.3
0.7
0.5
9.6

2.3
1.3
0.8
17.4

0.6
0.4
0.2
3.2

1.0
0.6
0.3
6.1

Unit notes: (1) Total dollars per dollar of capex. (2) Jobs per million dollars of capex.
Table notes: Type I effects include direct and indirect effects of investment spending. Type II effects include, in addition, the
induced impacts from the additional household spending of workers with increased earnings. See the appendix for the
methodology.

capex once the induced effects are included.
The additional economic activity from a
dollar of capex leads to $0.4 of additional
household earnings for workers from direct
and indirect effects, and a Type II multiplier
of 0.7. Every million dollars spent in capex
creates 7.5 jobs in America from the Type I
multiplier, rising to 14.0 jobs per million
spent from the Type II multiplier.
The economic impacts for output, value
added, and household earnings are not very
sensitive to whether the main or the first
alternate assumptions are used; the results
from the alternate assumptions are quite
similar. The second set of alternate
assumptions lead to much smaller multipliers
for each type of impact considered. The large
differences with the main set of assumptions
arises because nearly all the money is spent
on wireless equipment under these
assumptions, and a large amount of such
equipment is imported. Larger differences
among the results appear for the employment
added sums to less than one because of imports and
other leakages.

estimates. The Type II multiplier for
employment is 14.0 with the main
assumptions but ranges from 6.1 to 17.4 with
the alternate assumptions. 19
18F

These multipliers for mobile broadband
investment are also the economic
opportunity costs when such investment does
not take place. Thus, each dollar not invested
can pull more than a dollar out of the
economy, whether measured by sales or
GDP, reduces earnings, and prevent jobs
from being created. The total scale of the
opportunity costs created by current policy
toward mobile data roaming is estimated in
section III.B.3 below.

The larger variance among the outcomes arises
because construction is highly labor intensive (at least
compared to the equipment manufacturing industries
used in the calculations) and the proportion of
spending going toward construction varies greatly
among the alternate assumptions.
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III. Analysis of the poor incentives
to invest fostered by current policy
This section discusses the disincentives
created by access regulation in general (in
part A) and mobile data roaming in particular
(Part B). The section concludes with a
quantification of the economic harm caused
by policy toward mobile data roaming.

A. Telecommunications
investment

policy

and

Infrastructure investment is highly sensitive to
changes in telecommunications policy and
uncertainty about how committed regulators
are to the status quo. Economic investment
depends crucially on an expectation of a
healthy return on the capital expenditure.
Regulators cannot take continued investment
and
the
robust
health
of
the
telecommunications
infrastructure
for
granted. The basic economic theory behind
the proposition is straightforward. Businesses
undertake investment activity only if they
expect to earn a rate of return high enough to
cover the risks involved and other
opportunity costs of capital. Some potential
investment projects will be near the breakeven point, so that even small adverse
changes in risk or other costs can make them
unprofitable. Regulatory policy that raises
investment or innovation costs, lowers
revenue or pushes it farther into the future,
or increases business risk will push these
marginally profitable potential projects into
the red, so that businesses will not pursue
these opportunities. While the resulting
social cost of such misguided regulation does
not show up in any accountant’s ledger, the
negative impact on consumers and firms is
nonetheless real.

A sizeable literature by economists and
others documents how communications
investment and innovation can be choked off
by poor policy (Prieger and Heil, 2008;
Cambini and Jiang, 2009). In the review of
the literature here, only peer-reviewed
research published in academic books and
journals is included, to exclude industrysponsored research that may not have
survived peer review. One analysis examined
the rate at which new communications
services were introduced by regulated firms
during a period when the FCC experimented
with lighter regulation. The study found that
the number of services created during the
period of lighter regulation was 60-99 percent
higher than the model predicted if stricter
regulation had remained in place (Prieger,
2002). A similar study examining state-level
data found that when lighter-touch state
regulation was applied the incumbent
telecommunications company in Indiana in
the 1990s, it created new services 2 to 4.5
times faster than it did under a previous,
more-restrictive regime (Prieger, 2001).
Other studies compare regulatory regimes to
quantify how regulatory stringency dampens
investment
and
innovation
in
telecommunications. Ai and Sappington
(2002) show that state regulatory regimes in
the
United
States
that
allowed
telecommunications providers more leeway
in setting their prices induced investment in
process innovation that lowered operating
costs.
Prieger
(2007)
demonstrates
empirically that shorter regulatory delay in
offering new telecommunications services
leads to quicker product innovation; in other
words, there is a “delay multiplier” effect
from poor regulation. Another strand of the
12

literature focuses specifically on broadband.
Assessing the impact of differences in state
regulation, Prieger and Lee (2008) find that
the evidence is consistent with stricter
regulation (rate of return regulation, in this
case) dampening the incentive to deploy
broadband infrastructure and service,
compared to alternative, lighter-touch
regulation.
More recent literature addresses the impact
of liberal policies toward service-based
competition—i.e., access regulation—instead
of encouraging and relying on infrastructurebased competition. One recent study
summarizes the current state of knowledge:
“the majority of the empirical literature
suggests that infrastructure-based competition
has a positive impact on both investment and
penetration. In turn, the evidence regarding
service-based competition relying on
broadband access regulations tends to be
negatively related to investment activities….”
(Briglauer, 2014, p.54, emphasis added).
Whether studies examine broadband
deployment in the United States (Jung et al.,
2008) or Europe (Hausman & Sidak, 2005;
Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009; Grajek &
Röller, 2012; Briglauer, Ecker, & Gugler,
2013), they find that mandated access
regulation (of which mobile data roaming is
an example) leads to lower investment in and
less deployment of next-generation networks.
As one of these studies concludes:
“promoting market entry by means of
regulated access undermines incentives to
invest in facilities-based competition” (Grajek
& Röller, 2012, p.189). Given the many
sources of data, varying methodology, and
competing interests motivating the research,
not every study comes to the same

conclusion. However, as a comprehensive
survey of the empirical literature concluded,
“…most of the evidence shows that local loop
unbundling based on forward-looking cost
methodology discourages both ILECs and
CLECs from investing in networks” (Cambini
& Jiang, 2009).
Mandating access to facilities deployed by
rivals also has been shown by some studies to
be less effective than facilities-based
competition at encouraging broadband
adoption by consumers, or to discourage it
outright. Again, some studies look at
America (Denni and Gruber, 2007) while
others cover Europe (Cava-Ferreruela and
Albau-Munoz, 2006; Distaso, Lupi, and
Manenti, 2006; Höffler, 2007; Bouckaert et
al., 2010). There is less unanimity in the
literature regarding the impact of access
regulation on broadband diffusion than on
investment. Yet, in general, the findings from
these studies are that infrastructure-based
competition has a significant positive impact
on broadband penetration, while access
regulation and unbundling is less important
or has no effect—or even a negative effect—on
the spread of broadband Internet access.
To think about why access regulation may
hinder broadband adoption, consider the
case of mobile roaming. When a carrier
relies on roaming to serve customers in a
rural area, it is unlikely to sign customers
onto its network who live in that area. 20 Thus
consumers there will not enjoy the benefits of
the added competition—lower prices, higher
network quality, etc.—that facilities-based
19F

Instead, the roaming will be for the convenience of
its subscribers in other areas in which it has its own
network coverage, for when they roam outside their
home areas.
20
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entry would entail, and some of them may
find the value proposition unattractive
enough to stay off the network.
Proponents of access regulation often justify
it based on the so-called “stepping-stone” or
“ladder-of-investment” (LOI) theory. The
LOI approach claims that service-based
competition (when entrants lease access to
incumbents’ facilities) serves as the bottom
rungs of a ladder ascending to facility-based
entry. The theory may be attractive to
regulators trying to stimulate competition in
markets by artificially creating competitors
who have not entered the market in the
traditional sense by investing in their own
infrastructure. Notwithstanding the appeal,
there is little empirical support for LOI
theory. Most of the empirical work draws on
data
from
Europe,
where
telecommunications regulators have explicitly
adopted the LOI framework. Bacache,
Bourreau, and Gaudin (2014) show in a
careful econometric study of the European
experience that there is no empirical support
for the LOI hypothesis. Firms entering only
by means of mandated access to rivals’
network did not transition toward
infrastructure-based competition.

B. Policy toward data roaming in the
United States
1. Public policy regarding roaming
Roaming in the mobile communications
industry refers to the process by which one
wireless provider uses another provider’s
network to serve its customers. Roaming
allows a carrier’s customers to travel out of its
home territory (the areas it has deployed its
network) but still be able to complete mobile
calls and enjoy broadband access. Roaming

has been around for as long as the mobile
voice industry, and at first relied on private
contractual arrangements between carriers.
The FCC first established rules in favor of
roaming in 2007 for voice communication,
requiring host providers to “automatically”
allow access to any carrier agreeing to
reasonable terms and conditions ( FCC,
2015b). In 2010, the FCC eliminated the
home market rule, which had stipulated that
if a provider owned spectrum covering an
area it could not demand roaming from other
providers there. The sound economic logic
behind the home market rule was that the
option to rely on roaming should not serve to
discourage
facilities-based
network
competition, when the spectrum is licensed
and readily available for use.
In April 2011, the FCC issued its first set of
rules specifically for mobile data roaming
(FCC, 2011a). Under these rules, the
obligation of a host provider to automatically
allow roaming on its network was extended to
data service. The rules require facilities-based
service providers of mobile broadband to
offer data roaming arrangements to other
providers on “commercially reasonable terms
and conditions.” In its order, the FCC
concluded that the data roaming rules would
“promote consumer access to seamless
mobile
data
coverage
nationwide,
appropriately balance the incentives for new
entrants and incumbent providers to invest in
and deploy advanced networks across the
country, and foster competition among
multiple providers in the industry….” (FCC,
2011a, at 13). In other words, the FCC relied
upon the ladder of investment (LOI) theory
to justify its access regulation, despite the
empirical literature reviewed above either
14

questioning whether it leads to those rosy
outcomes or demonstrating that it does not.
In May 2014, T-Mobile USA petitioned the
FCC to provide guidance on what
“commercially reasonable” should mean in
practice and on what role the extent of buildout should play in the determination. In
December 2014, the FCC granted three
specific requests made by T-Mobile in its
Declaratory Ruling (FCC, 2014b). While the
details are complex, the general result of the
new rules is that mobile data roaming
becomes cheaper and easier for requesting
providers. First, the FCC set forth several
benchmarks by which to assess whether
proposed data roaming rates are reasonable:
retail rates, international roaming rates,
MVNO/resale rates, and other domestic
roaming rates (despite the fact that the
technology, geography, and other cost factors
underlying these other rates may have been
completely different), any or all of which may
be considered on a per-case basis. Second,
the FCC removed the presumption that a
past data roaming agreement is reasonable
when negotiating the next agreement. Third,
the host provider was disallowed from
denying roaming services to a requesting
provider on the basis that the otherwise builtout requesting provider had not built out in
the particular area at issue.
AT&T and Verizon have filed petitions with
the FCC contesting the new interpretations of
the original data roaming order; the FCC is
currently considering those requests that its
latest guidelines be reviewed (Goldstein,
2015). Some of the carriers’ objections are
procedural in nature, arguing that the FCC
effectively changed regulations without an
actual proceeding for a rulemaking. Another

objection made is that by recasting the test for
commercial reasonableness as something to
be determined by the FCC on a case-by-case
basis, the regulator has imposed a vague
standard—actually, a non-standard—leading to
unpredictable outcomes. Vagueness can lead
to arbitrary decisions regarding the terms and
rates for roaming agreements; as discussed
above uncertainty of outcomes is likely to
discourage investment on both sides. 21 The
main economic concern is related to the
theory and empirical evidence regarding
access regulation discussed above: allowing
roaming discourages mobile service providers
to expand their own coverage and invest in
building out wireless infrastructure.
20F

2. Negative consequences of the
policy in general
The review of the literature above indicated
that access regulation in general leads to the
(entirely predictable) consequence that
facilities-based competition and investment is
retarded. With specific reference to data
roaming, it is easy to see the perverse
incentives the current rules provide. Allowing
non-investing carriers to interconnect their
mobile data customers in rural areas to their
rivals’ networks at advantaged rates throws
water on the fire to deploy their own
infrastructure. Consumers lose out on at least
two benefits. First, research by Prieger,
Molnar, and Savage (2014) shows that
competition
using
facilities-based
Economic theory—as well as common business
sense—has long made it clear that regulatory
uncertainty prevents or delays private investment.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show formally how
uncertainty creates an option value for the would-be
investor to wait until the uncertainty is lessened or
resolved. Teisberg (1993) shows that firms invest less
and delay investment when faced with uncertain
outcomes created by regulation.
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infrastructure spurs providers to improve the
speed of broadband. While their results were
estimated using data from the wired
broadband market, the same principle can
apply to wireless. Clearly a data roaming
provider cannot offer higher speeds to its
subscribers if it is not deploying the
infrastructure to do so. Without this
competitive impetus, the host roaming
provider also misses out on the additional
incentive
to
upgrade
its
facilities.
Furthermore, despite the spectrum crunch,
licensed bandwidth lies fallow, since the
roaming carrier typically uses (and therefore
congests) the host provider’s spectrum, not its
own. 22
21 F

Second, reliance on data roaming for rural
areas in many cases will not expand
competitive options for rural residents. If a
person lives in an area covered by a spectrum
license held by a provider which has not built
out in that area, it is unlikely that the provider
would allow the user to sign up for mobile
broadband service. Instead, the data roaming
is typically offered instead as a convenience
to subscribers from other (more urbanized)
areas who are traveling. For example, as
noted by AT&T (Marsh, 2014), T-Mobile
holds spectrum licenses covering the United
States but does not in fact (based on its
coverage maps from the time) offer service in
many rural areas in the Midwest, Mountain,
and certain Eastern portions of the U.S. In a
separate analysis of the largely rural states of
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Wyoming, Smith (2015) finds

that Sprint and T-Mobile hold spectrum
licenses in each county in each state, but
provide neither voice nor data service in 77%
of those counties. In contrast, AT&T and
Verizon, the main host roaming providers in
those states, each offer mobile voice and data
service in almost all counties. 23
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Under the 2014 Declaratory Ruling, the host
provider is not allowed to denying data
roaming services to a competitor on the basis
that the requesting provider has not deployed
its own infrastructure in the area even when it
has built out in other areas. Through its
decision, the FCC in essence gives noninvesting mobile broadband providers license
to ignore at least the intent of the buildout
requirements inherent in the ownership of
spectrum licenses. The purposes of the
buildout requirements are to encourage
licensees to provide facilities-based service in
a timely manner, to prevent the
“warehousing” of spectrum (obtaining
licenses merely to prevent rivals from having
it), to promote the provision of innovative
services throughout the license areas, and to
encourage provision of service in rural areas
(GAO, 2014).
The letter of the law regarding the buildout
requirements for spectrum holdings is quite
involved, and varies by type of license (the
geography, spectrum band, and wireless
services authorized). The requirements
themselves vary with regard to how buildout
is measured (e.g., fraction of population or
area), whether there is just one or multiple
AT&T and Verizon offer mobile data coverage in at
least parts of more than 99.5% of the counties in these
five states (although not every part of every county is
covered in some cases). Refer to the coverage maps
and Appendix A in Smith (2015).
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in the case of Sprint and T-Mobile, the companies
nearly always holds licensed spectrum in the areas it
instead relies upon roaming, as discussed in the next
paragraph.
22
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milestones for coverage to be met, and how
much time after acquisition of the license is
granted to meet the goals. 24 Given the
complexity of the requirements and the fact
that virtually the only entity that could verify
whether they are met is the license holder
itself—which is why the FCC relies on selfcertification
to
“enforce”
buildout
requirements for wireless services—it is
beyond the scope of this report to assess
whether buildout in any particular area has
been met. The spirit of the rules, however, is
clear from the goals: to provide service and
an expanded set of competitive choices to
consumers, especially in rural areas, in a
timely manner. 25
23 F
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Thus, an obligation to offer data roaming
“automatically” to rivals provides clear
disincentives to invest in network-based
competition. There is even some evidence
that roaming has spurred some disinvestment
in the past. In some cases Sprint has told
subscribers in particular areas that it was
switching to roaming when it had formerly
provided coverage using its own network. 26
25 F

3. An estimate of the scale of the
negative economic impacts
In the United States today, there are four
major, national providers of mobile
broadband service: AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile,
and Verizon. Each holds spectrum licenses to
offer mobile wireless voice and data services
in almost all parts of the country. However,
only two of those providers, AT&T and
Verizon, have both committed to and
achieved deploying the infrastructure needed
to serve latest-generation mobile broadband
to most of rural America. The latest report
from
the
FCC
on
the
mobile
communications market shows that the LTE
networks for mobile broadband of AT&T
and Verizon cover 85% and 92%,
respectively, of rural population in the
United States. On the other hand, Sprint and
T-Mobile each cover less than half of the
rural population with their LTE networks.
The stark differences in rural coverage are
shown in Figure 1. 27
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Building infrastructure in rural areas requires
large investments. Figure 2 shows the wireless
capex in recent years of the four national
mobile broadband providers. 28 AT&T and
27 F

Refer to GAO, 2014, for an explication and review
of the FCC’s build-out requirements.
The FCC had an interesting notion to offer in
(oblique) response to such criticisms. In the
Declaratory Ruling, the FCC (2014b) stated that is
some areas “it is uneconomical for several providers to
buildout.” The obvious question one then must ask is:
why did they sell multiple spectrum licenses for such
areas? The rationale for selling multiple licenses in
each area was, on the one hand, that technology and
the scale of consumer demand had changed drastically
enough since the 1980s that wireless communications
was no longer a natural monopoly or duopoly in which
provision by only one or two providers was most
efficient. On the other hand, multiple licenses were
offered in recognition of the benefits to consumers of
vigorous facilities-based competition among providers.
Quinn (2012a,b) documents (from Sprint’s
announcements and coverage maps provided to
24
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customers) one such episode in Kansas and
Oklahoma in 2012, which Sprint openly described as
a “cost-cutting measure.” Sprint also told investors that
reliance on roaming instead of deploying
infrastructure had led the company to spend $15
billion less in capex from 2008 to 2011 than it
otherwise would have (Sprint Nextel [2012], quoted
and discussed in Quinn [2012c]).
Note that the FCC states that their calculations likely
result in an overstatement of the extent of mobile
wireless coverage.
An industry economist pointed out that these
wireless capex figures underestimate the true
deployment costs of mobile broadband, since wireless
communications often depends on wired backhaul.
However, backhaul fees paid to wireline appear as
27

28
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Figure 1: Estimated Mobile LTE Coverage in Rural Areas by Service Provider, July 2015
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Source: FCC, 2015b.

Verizon have invested more than twice as
much as Sprint and T-Mobile since 2011. 29
Of course, not all capex during these years
went to rural broadband; providers were also
adding bandwidth and improving facilities in
urban areas as well. However, much did go
toward building out in less urban and rural
areas. Since 2012, AT&T has more than
doubled its LTE broadband coverage (in
terms of population covered), from 150
million people covered in November 2012 to
over 300 million covered today (FCC, 2013,
2015b). Verizon increased its LTE
broadband coverage from 200 million people
28F

operating expenses for the wireless carrier or division,
not capex.
AT&T and Verizon invested $101.6B in wireless
capex during these years, while Sprint and T-Mobile
USA invested $43.1B. The former figure is 136%
more than the latter figure.
29

covered in November 2012 to over 300
million today. Both AT&T and Verizon now
cover about 97% of the total population in
the nation as of July 2015, per analysis by the
FCC (2015b). Sprint and T-Mobile, while
improving their LTE coverage over the years,
still do not offer the latest generation of
mobile broadband to 15% of Americans,
mostly in rural areas. 30
29F

Without the data roaming rules, either in the
original form from the 2011 Order or the
modified form from the 2014 Declaratory
The FCC (2015b) calculates that AT&T covers
302.1 million of the 312.5 million people in the nation
with its LTE mobile broadband network, and that
Verizon covers 303.2 million. Sprint covers 265.6
million and T-Mobile covers 266.2 million people,
although it is unclear from the FCC report whether
those figures include the LTE roaming areas of the
two carriers.

30
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Figure 2: Wireless Capital Expenditure by Major Providers, 2011-2015
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Note: Data for AT&T and Sprint for 2015 are estimated. Sources: FCC (2015b), Verizon Communications (2016), Raymond
James Financial (Louthan, 2015), Skyline Marketing Group (Celentano, 2015), and T-Mobile US (2016).

Ruling, what would investment look like for
Sprint and T-Mobile? Analyzing a
counterfactual is always difficult, because—by
definition—the object of study is not observed
directly. And, while economists in the field of
industrial organization have made great
econometric strides in recent decades toward
estimating an industry’s response to
counterfactual situations, the detailed data
needed for such techniques are unavailable
here. Therefore instead of performing a
formal econometric analysis, a more
informal—yet still illuminating—procedure is
adopted here.
If Sprint and T-Mobile could not rely on data
roaming to extend their coverage areas, or
could only do so for a brief time while they
deployed their own infrastructure, then to
offer LTE coverage comparable to AT&T

and Verizon they would each have to have
covered about 37 million additional people
with their networks as of midyear 2015. 31 The
bulk of these people without coverage—24
million of them—are in rural areas. To be
conservative, only these rural Americans not
covered by Sprint and T-Mobile will be
included in the analysis.
30F

How much investment would it have taken to
cover these additional people? Wireless
broadband deployment costs per head
covered vary hugely in the estimates of
academics, industry, and business analysts. At
the extreme low end, one source in the trade
press refers to figures purportedly from a
major carrier indicating that it would cost $69
per head covered to push mobile broadband
This figure is based on the LTE coverage figures in
the previous footnote.
31
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out to 55 million rural inhabitants. 32 This
figure would be for a “brownfield”
deployment of LTE where previous
generation mobile networks are already
deployed. Bazelon (2010) estimates that the
capex required for greenfield fixed wireless
broadband for a particular rural county is
$219 per household, 33 which would be about
$85 per person. Fixed wireless costs are
typically lower than mobile broadband costs,
due to the lower spectral efficiency expected
with mobile communications. Other sources
for remote rural areas with difficult terrain
and extremely sparse population arrive at
coverage costs around $1,000 per
subscriber. 34
31 F

32 F
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For another source of mobile wireless
deployment costs, consider the reverse
auctions the FCC conducted for the Connect
America Mobility Fund. 35 In these auctions,
34 F

the FCC designated a set of unserved areas
for bidding and providers bid on the
minimum one-time support payment they
would accept in exchange for deploying 3G
(or better) mobile service to the area. If the
auctions served as an effective informationrevelation device, the winning bids would be
roughly the same as the deployment cost. 36
The distribution of the 483 winning bids for
areas in the mainland U.S., expressed as
dollars per population living in the area
covered, is shown in Figure 3. The range of
implied deployment cost per head is huge:
the interquartile range stretches from $433
per capita to $4,459. The median winning
bid was $1,453 and the average was $1,381
(both per capita.)
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Given the variety of figures presented here,
reasonable and conservative estimates for the
capital expenditure necessary to deploy LTE
would appear to be in the range of roughly
$100 to $1,400 per person. 37 The analysis
here proceeds by adopting a conservative
figure near the low end of these estimates:
$200 of capex required per person covered.
As a final point of comparison, the $200 per
36 F

See RWA (2011). The organization claims that in a
temporarily unredacted filing to the FCC, AT&T
stated that incremental rural LTE deployment could
be extended to 55 million mostly rural Americans for
$3.8 billion. Dividing the latter figure by the former
yields $69.09 per head. Neither the claim nor the
context of the statements can be verified at the present
time.
This figure excludes cost for the spectrum license.
One cost estimate for a small (120 subscriber) rural
cell site came to a total of $107,000 for the tower site,
necessary studies, equipment, and backhaul (Yurok
Tribe Information Services Department, 2011). Those
figures amount to about $890 per subscriber. Another
study for fixed wireless broadband provision in
Wyoming arrived at a figure of $1,243 up front capital
cost per customer. Deployment of fixed wireless
broadband is typically less expensive than mobile
broadband, since the fixed equipment does not need
to handle the complications that arise from mobility
such as handoff between cell sites and impairment of
mobile channels with interference, multipath, and
blockage, all of which are highly spatially and
temporally variable (Bergman, 2014).
Details on Phase I of the Mobility Fund are in FCC
(2011b), at 301-478.
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Auction theory suggests that bids would be the
difference between the present value of the expected
revenue stream on the one hand and the deployment
cost plus the expected stream of operating costs on the
other hand (or, more precisely, the winning bid would
be a bit below the second-lowest such difference, with
the carrier with the lowest such difference winning the
auction). Assuming that mobile service would be
priced high enough to cover operating costs in these
areas, the difference reduces to the deployment cost.
The bids were placed in 2012 and have not been
adjusted for inflation here.
The low end of the range comes from Bazelon’s
fixed wireless deployment estimate of $85/head
discussed above, marked up to account for the lower
efficiency of mobile broadband and inflation since
2010. The high end of this conservative range is
around the mean and median of the Mobility Fund
winning bids discussed in the text.
36
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Figure 3: Support per Capita for Mobile Network Deployment Derived from the
FCC Mobility Fund Auction
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head assumed here is much less than the
$413 per subscriber offered as high-cost
support under the FCC’s Connect America
Fund for areas unserved by broadband. 38
37 F

These figures imply that in a counterfactual
world without Sprint and T-Mobile being

able to rely indefinitely on data roaming in
rural areas, and in which the two providers
take seriously the intent of their buildout
obligation, there would have been an
additional $9.6 billion in wireless investment
in recent years. 39 This amount is the total
across both companies. 40 Note that this
38F
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Phase II of the Connect America Fund employed an
economic-engineering cost model to identify high-cost
areas lacking competition. The total CAF II funding
offered across the nation was about $1.5 billion to
cover 3.6 million mostly rural homes and businesses.
The implied $413 per subscriber includes operating
expenditure and not just capex, but on the other hand
it only includes a year’s worth of amortization of the
capex. The number is also lowered compared to the
other estimates of capex/head because 1) business
locations are included in the denominator, 2) it is an
amount to be offered as supplemental support, not the
actual full yearly cost of providing service, and 3) it is
for fixed broadband, not mobile.
38

The figure is the result of multiplying $200 capex per
head by 24 million people by two carriers: 200 × 24
million × 2 = 9.6 billion.
A possible objection to the calculations may be that
if Sprint and T-Mobile had spent the additional $3.8
billion to extend their rural coverage that they would
have spent less in other areas. This appears to be
unlikely. If it was profitable to undertake the other
investment that actually occurred, the additional
spending postulated here does not change that fact.
Companies seek profitable investment projects and
then raise funding for them (whether internally or by
going to debt or equity markets); basic
microeconomics teaches that unlike households, firms
39
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amount of spending is still less than the
difference in capex in any single year between
these firms on the one hand and AT&T and
Verizon on the other, as can be derived from
Figure 2. The amount, while not small,
appears to have been within the capabilities
of the firms to have spent had they not been
able to rely of roaming. 41
40F

What impact did that forgone investment
have on the economy? Multiplying the $9.6
billion in forgone capex by the multipliers
calculated in section II.B above yields the
outcomes in Table 2. Under the main set of
assumptions, the Type I effects show that the
economy lost out on $11.7 billion in
additional sales that would have added $6.4
billion to GDP. Forgone earnings total $4.0
billion, while about 71,500 new jobs would
have been created but were not. Under the
alternative assumptions described above,
do not begin their economic decision-making with a
budget constraint.
It appears that spending an additional $9.6 billion in
total would have been well within the capabilities of
the firms. If Sprint would have spent the same
proportion of capex to service revenue in 2010-2012
that it did in 2013, it could have spent $10.5 billion
more in those years—more than necessary to make up
its half of the $9.6 billion in additional capex
underlying the estimates above. Thus, based on
Sprint’s 2013 level of capex, there is no indication that
the additional investment amounts discussed here
would have strained the company’s financial
capacities. The same calculation for T-Mobile USA
implies the company could have spent $2.8 billion
more on capex during 2010–2012. This is less than
the $4.8 billion making up T-Mobile’s half of the
additional capex discussed here. However, if the
additional amount were spread evenly among 2010–
2012, it would be a 55% to 59% increase over actual
capex in those years. T-Mobile in fact raised its capex
by 51% in 2013 over its average level from the
previous three years, with no apparent financial strain
on the company or degradation of its stock price. The
capex and service revenue estimates used in these
calculations come from FCC (2015b).
41

additional output not created ranges from
$6.2 billion to $12.6 billion and value-notadded ranges from $3.5 billion to $7.0
billion. The figures for earnings and
employment have similarly broad ranges.
However, even the low end of the estimates—
lost incremental earnings of $1.8 billion and
about 30,500 jobs—are sizeable economic
impacts on the labor market. The high end
of the estimates includes incremental
earnings of $4.8 billion prevented from
entering the pockets of workers and about
91,900 positions never created.
The Type I economic effects stop short of
tracing out all the impacts of the changes in
the economy due to the spending since they
do not include the induced effects from the
additional household spending of workers.
The Type II effects, included on the right
side of Table 2, show that the forgone
investment from reliance on data roaming led
to much larger final economic impacts than
the Type I effects capture. Under the main
set of assumptions, the Type II effects
indicate that if Sprint and T-Mobile would
have spent the additional $9.6 billion in
capex, there would have been $19.8 billion in
additional sales in the American economy,
adding $10.9 billion to GDP. Earnings would
have increased by $6.4 billion, while about
134,100 new jobs would have been created.
Under the alternative assumptions, as much
as $22.2 billion in additional sales would have
ensued and as much as $12.4 billion of value
would have been added to the economy. The
low end of the estimates include $2.9 billion
for additional earnings and 58,500 jobs, while
the high-end estimates are incremental
earnings of $7.6 billion and about 166,600
new positions. All of this additional
22

Table 2: Economic Benefits Forgone Due to Reliance on
Mobile Data Roaming Instead of Investment in Infrastructure
Type I Effects
Final-Demand Multiplier
Output ($B)
Value added ($B)
Earnings ($B)
Employment (# jobs)

Type II Effects

Main
Assumptions

Alternative
Assumptions

Main
Assumptions

Alternative
Assumptions

11.7
6.4
4.0

6.2 – 12.6
3.5 – 7.0
1.8 – 4.8
30,467 –
91,888

19.8
10.9
6.4

9.8 – 22.2
5.6 – 12.4
2.9 – 7.6
58,454 –
166,630

71,531

134,122

Notes: Impacts are based on $9.6 billion additional investment in wireless capex. Type I effects include direct and indirect effects
of investment spending. Type II effects include, in addition, the induced impacts from the additional household spending of
workers with increased earnings.

economic activity would have been most
welcome in the generally weak economy and
labor market since the recent recession.
The estimates here are meant to suggest the
possible magnitude of the proximate
economic consequences of lax policy toward
mobile data roaming. The ultimate
consequences for the economy may have
been even larger, for two reasons. The
estimates in Table 2 do not include “network
effects”, which arise from the ways that
business and consumer behavior and
capabilities change due to mobile broadband
infrastructure. 42 As discussed above, as a
general-purpose
technology,
mobile
broadband
infrastructure
allows
the
transformation of existing industries and the
creation of new technologies, firms,
industries, and ways of using labor that would
create extra value for the economy. Second,
the calculations are based on expansion of
Sprint and T-Mobile’s networks to cover

additional rural Americans only. If these
providers would have also expanded their
network coverage in nonrural areas to match
AT&T and Verizon, an additional 13 million
Americans would have been covered in those
regions. Even generously assuming that
deployment of LTE in nonrural areas costs
only $80 per head (only 40% of the assumed
cost for rural areas), covering these additional
people would increase all of the benefits
from investment shown in Table 2 by
between one-fifth and one-quarter. 43
42F

41F

Atkinson et al. (2009) discuss such network effects in
the general context of investment in digital
infrastructure.
42

At $80/head instead of the assumed $200/head for
rural coverage, there would have been $80 × 13
million people × 2 carriers = $2.1 billion in additional
wireless capex. This spending would add 22% to the
$9.6 in capex calculated above for the rural areas, and
all the figures in Table 2 would increase by 22%.
43
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Appendix
This appendix contains some additional detail on
the calculation of the multipliers and the final
economic impacts discussed in the text.

Evolved packet core expenditures are
associated with BEA commodity
334413, Semiconductor and related
device manufacturing. 46
3. For every four dollars spent on the items in
numbers 1 and 2 above, another dollar is
spent on engineering services. This estimate
appears to be conservative; the wireless
industry as a whole spends a far greater share
on NAICS category 541300, Architectural,
engineering, and related services, than on
equipment (but the industry requirements
table mingles opex and capex).
4. For every four dollars spent on the items in
numbers 1-3 above for the wireless-specific
part of the capex and associated engineering
costs, another dollar is spent upgrading other
parts of the wired network to handle the
additional traffic. This dollar is spent on
additional engineering services, fiber optic
cable, and other equipment for the wired
broadband network (associated to the same
BEA commodities as in number 2 above).
The proportions for these three items are the
same as for the BEA direct requirements for
the wireless communications industry.
o

45F

The main set of assumptions are as follows:
1. In the breakdown of whither goes a dollar of
capex, it is assumed that 31% of wireless
capex is spent on wireless equipment. This
figure is derived from the estimated share of
wireless equipment spending to wireless
capex for the wireless broadband industry,
averaged over 2012-2015 (Credit Suisse,
2014).
2. For that wireless-specific part of the capex,
70% of spending is for radio equipment, 15%
is for backhaul, and 15% is for the LTE
evolved packet core. 44 These items are linked
to data from BEA in the following manner:
o Radio equipment is associated with
BEA commodity 334220, Broadcast
and
wireless
communications
equipment.
o Backhaul is associated with BEA
commodity 335920, Communication
and energy wire and cable
manufacturing (for fiber optic). 45
43F

44 F

A wireless industry analyst is quoted in Mucci (2013)
as saying that 70% of wireless capex is devoted to
construction, installation, and equipment for the radio
component of the network, while the rest goes to
construction, installation, and equipment for the
backhaul and LTE (i.e., evolved packet core).
Two issues arise with backhaul. First, backhaul in the
mobile wireless industry is often purchased from other
providers. However, the FCC’s most recent industry
report states that “the leading mobile wireless service
providers have deployed or are in the process of
deploying Ethernet backhaul either over fiber or
microwave to their cell sites” ( FCC, 2015b at 70). In
particular, “As of March 2015, of its 54,000 cell sites,
T-Mobile already has fiber backhaul connections to
50,000 sites” and “Sprint’s network modernization was
substantially completed in 2014 which utilizes
Ethernet for its backhaul and its LTE network covered
44

45

more than 280 million people as of May 2015” ( FCC,
2015b at 70)
Some of these expenditures may instead be
associated with 334210, Telephone apparatus
manufacturing, which (despite the old-fashioned
sounding name) includes equipment such as routers.
However, the industry spends far more on commodity
334413 than on commodity 334210, per the BEA’s
direct requirements table for the wireless
communications industry. The 2007 Direct
Requirements
table
shows
that
wireless
telecommunications carriers (industry 517210) use 5.9
cents worth of commodity 334413 (semiconductors)
but only 0.6 cents worth of commodity 334210
(telephone apparatus) to create a dollar’s worth of
output. Thus, commodity 334413 is chosen. Given the
minor
differences
in
the
multipliers
for
semiconductors and telephone apparatus, this decision
does not affect the final results much.
46
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5. The remainder of capex goes to construction.
The relevant construction category in the
BEA commodity/industry tables is 2332C0,
Nonresidential structures, which includes
category 233240, power and communication
structures (among others).
After establishing these assumptions, the next
step toward calculating the multipliers is to
determine for spending on manufactured goods
how much of each dollar goes toward the
manufacturer, how much goes to the wholesaler,
and how much for transported the manufactured
goods. 47 These are known as the distribution
costs for the manufactured commodities.
Following the accepted methodology provided by
BEA results in the following figures: 80% of
spending
on
broadcast
and
wireless
communications equipment goes to the
manufacturer, 18% to the wholesale industry, and
the trivial remainder goes to transportation. For
communication and energy wire and cable
manufactured goods, the similar breakdown is
77% to the manufacturer, 22% to wholesale, and
1% to transportation. The same three figures for
semiconductor and related device manufactured
goods are 82%, 16%, and 1% to the
manufacturer, the wholesaler, and transporter,
resp.
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Next, how much of spending on the
manufactured items stays within the domestic
economy is determined, versus leaking abroad
through the purchase of imported goods. The
fraction of domestically produced and delivered
goods out of all purchases (domestic + imported)
by industry is found from United States Census
Bureau’s Manufacturing and International Trade
Report: 2013 and 2012. Matching industries as
closely as possible to the BEA categories, the
following figures are used: 21% of commodity
334220, 71% of commodity 335920, and 60% of
commodity 334413 is domestically produced.
The BEA (2013) documentation on the use of the
RIMS II multipliers describes this procedure.
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The rest of the spending (the part going to
imported goods) disappears from the rest of the
calculations.
The result of these assumptions and procedures
is the final breakdown of a dollar of wireless
capex as shown in Table 3. The final column
sums to less than 100% due to spending on
imported goods.
Table 3: Division of Total Wireless Capex
into Its Constituent Domestic Parts

Commodity/Industry

Fraction of
wireless
capex

Broadcast and wireless
communications equipment

5.3%

Communication and energy wire
and cable manufacturing

4.0%

Semiconductor and related
device manufacturing

7.7%

Architectural, engineering, and
related services

15.5%

Construction of Nonresidential
structures

30.8%

Transportation

0.7%

Wholesale

9.7%

Note: Figures sum to less than 100% due to leakage to
imports.

The Type I and Type II multipliers for each of
the rows in the table above were obtained from
the BEA RIMS II system, where the region of
analysis was the contiguous United States. The
2007 benchmark input-output table for the nation
(to calculate linkages among industries) and 2013
regional data (to calculate leakages outside the
region) were used; these are the latest available
data in RIMS. The multipliers are shown in
Table 4 below.
The final multiplier of each type is a weighted
sum of the commodity-specific multipliers and
the “Fraction of wireless capex” weights in the
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previous table above. The final multipliers are
given in Table 1 in the text.
For the alternative assumptions, to hew to the
methodology of the original authors from which
the assumptions are taken, there are no

adjustments for distribution costs (transportation
and wholesaling). Otherwise the procedure to
arrive at the final multipliers in Table 1 is the
same as outlined above. In particular, this means
that unlike some of the original authors, leakages
to imports are still accounted for here.
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Table 4: Final Demand Multipliers for Mobile Broadband Investment

BEA/
NAICS

Commodity

Finaldemand
Output
(dollars)

Finaldemand
Earnings
(dollars)

Finaldemand
Employment
(number of
jobs/$M)

Finaldemand
Value-added
(dollars)

Type I Multipliers
334220

Broadcast and wireless
communications equipment

1.59

0.34

4.92

0.83

335920

Communication and energy
wire and cable manufacturing

2.24

0.42

7.30

0.70

334413

Semiconductor and related
device manufacturing

1.47

0.40

4.92

0.89

541300

Architectural, engineering, and
related services

1.73

0.65

11.13

0.93

334210

Telephone apparatus
manufacturing

1.69

0.41

5.54

0.84

2332C0

Nonresidential structures

1.65

0.66

12.77

0.91

484000

Truck transportation

1.85

0.55

11.40

0.87

420000

Wholesale trade

1.50

0.48

8.05

0.97

Type II Multipliers
334220

Broadcast and wireless
communications equipment

2.27

0.54

10.20

1.22

335920

Communication and energy
wire and cable manufacturing

3.08

0.67

13.85

1.17

334413

Semiconductor and related
device manufacturing

2.27

0.64

11.16

1.34

541300

Architectural, engineering, and
related services

3.02

1.03

21.24

1.66

334210

Telephone apparatus
manufacturing

2.50

0.65

11.89

1.29

2332C0

Nonresidential structures

2.96

1.04

22.99

1.64

484000

Truck transportation

2.96

0.88

20.00

1.50

420000

Wholesale trade

2.45

0.76

15.49

1.50

Note: The multipliers are from the BEA RIMS II system, where the region of analysis was the contiguous United States. The 2007
benchmark input-output table for the nation and 2013 regional data were used.
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